The Administrator's eight-count Complaint charged Respondent with engaging in misconduct from 2006 to 2012, including engaging in a conflict of interest when he entered into business transactions with his client without adequate disclosures, engaging in a criminal act by fraudulently notarizing a release of mortgage, making false statements to a tribunal, engaging in a conflict of interest in a real estate transaction by acting as both a broker and attorney, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law after failing to register, neglecting a number of foreclosure matters, failing to return unearned fees to clients, and failing to respond to the Administrator's requests for information.

The Hearing Board found the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in most of the misconduct charged. Given the serious and extensive misconduct engaged in by Respondent, the considerable aggravating evidence, which included Respondent's prior discipline, and the lack of mitigating evidence, the Hearing Board recommended Respondent be disbarred.

Upon review, Respondent argued that the Hearing Board Chair was biased against him and should have recused himself. He also contended that the Hearing Board erred in deeming certain allegations admitted and rejecting his alleged affirmative defenses. He disputed various findings of the Hearing Board and contended that the recommendation of disbarment was excessive. The Review Board considered Respondent's arguments and concluded that the Hearing Board's pre-hearing orders were within the Board's discretion. The Review Board found the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct were supported by the evidence. The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's findings of fact and the findings of misconduct. In light of the repeated and serious misconduct and the factors in aggravation, the Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board's recommendation of disbarment.

This matter arises out of the Administrator's eight count complaint charging Respondent with engaging in misconduct from 2006 through 2012, including but not limited to entering into a business transaction with a client without making the adequate disclosures, fraudulently notarizing a release of mortgage, making a false statement to a tribunal, engaging in numerous conflict of interests in real estate transactions, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law after failing to register, neglecting foreclosure matters and failing to return the clients' unearned fees and/or costs, and failing to cooperate with the ARDC and respond to requests for information. The Hearing Board found that Respondent engaged in most, but not all, of the misconduct charged in the Complaint. The Hearing Board found little mitigation and that Respondent's misconduct was aggravated by his lack of remorse, the harm caused to his clients and his prior discipline, a reprimand for similar misconduct in 2011. The Hearing Board recommended that Respondent be disbarred.

Upon review, Respondent contends that the Hearing Board violated his due process rights. He argues that the Hearing Board Chair was biased and should have recused

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himself from this matter. He contends that the Hearing Board improperly deemed certain allegations admitted and improperly sanctioned him for failure to comply with the Rule requiring the disclosure of witnesses. He also disputes some of the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct and argues that disbarment is unwarranted. For the following reasons, we are not swayed by Respondent's arguments and we affirm the Hearing Board's findings of misconduct. Like the Hearing Board, we recommend that Respondent be disbarred.

Respondent argues that his due process rights were violated because the Hearing Board Chair entered orders striking Respondent's affirmative defenses, deeming certain allegations of the Complaint admitted, and barring Respondent from calling certain witnesses. We have considered Respondent's arguments and have reviewed the record in this matter. We have concluded that the Chair did not abuse his discretion.

The Chair's orders were within the sound discretion of the Hearing Board and should not be disturbed by this Board on review absent an abuse of discretion. In re Golden, 09 CH 88, (Review Bd., July 23, 2012), Respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions denied, No. M.R. 25509 (Nov. 19, 2012); In re Petrulis, 96 CH 546 (Review Bd., Dec. 9., 1999), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 16556 (June 30, 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the Hearing Board. In re Auler, 02 SH 102 (Review Bd., March 21, 2005) at 11, recommendation adopted, No. M.R. 20207 (Sept. 26, 2005). See also, In re Williams , 2011PR00107 (Review Bd., Sept. 30, 2013), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 26430 (Jan. 17, 2014)(this Board found Hearing Board did not abuse its discretion by similarly sanctioning the attorney for failing to file an answer that complied with the rules despite the attorney's claims of racial prejudice).

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Respondent filed an Answer to the Administrator's Complaint on June 27, 2013. Although he admitted or denied some of the allegations, in other instances he failed to specifically admit or deny the allegation in violation of Commission Rules 233. He also filed numerous "Affirmative Defenses" that were not appropriate affirmative defenses. On July 19, the Chair directed Respondent to re-answer the allegations that the Administrator asked be deemed admitted. Respondent did not comply with the Chair's order. Instead, he filed an amended answer repeating many of his affirmative defenses and continuing to fail to comply with Rule 233. Accordingly, pursuant to Commission Rule 236, the Chair ordered that the portions of the answer that failed to comply with Rule 233 be deemed admitted. The Chair also ordered that the affirmative defenses be stricken and barred Respondent from presenting evidence of the affirmative defenses at hearing. In addition, Respondent failed to comply with Commission 253 and list any witnesses he planned to call at hearing. Accordingly, on November 15, 2013, the Chair entered an order barring Respondent from calling any witnesses other than the witnesses named in the Administrator's 253 Report. Given Respondent's failure to comply with the Rules, the Chair's orders were well within his discretion.

Due process principles do not support Respondent's claims. Due process requires that the respondent be given notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges. In re Chandler, 161 Ill.2d 459, 641 N.E.2d 473 (1994); In re Cooley, 91 CH 426 (Review Bd., Sept. 15, 1993), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 9484, 9522 (Jan. 25, 1994). Respondent was given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges; his failure to follow the Rules does not create a denial of due process.

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Prior to the hearing in this matter, Respondent moved that the Chair of the Hearing Panel "consider whether recusal was warranted" because the Chair had attended ABA seminars that the prior Counsel for the Administrator in this matter also attended. Respondent specifically stated that he was not requesting the removal or recusal of the Chair.

Respondent now argues that the Chair should have recused himself. We disagree. Respondent has waived this issue in light of his express refusal to request the substitution of the Chair. See, e.g., In re Jennings, 99 SH 32 (Review Bd., Dec. 27, 2000) at 11, Respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions denied, No. M.R. 17394 (May 25, 2001)(Review Board rejected argument that the Hearing Board improperly considered uncharged misconduct where the respondent had failed to object to the underlying evidence at hearing). Moreover, Respondent provides no support for the notion that a judge, or the Chair in a disciplinary proceeding, would be disqualified from hearing a matter because he or she attended the same bar association seminars as counsel in the matter.

We turn now to Respondent's conduct that led to the filing of the charges before us. As set out more fully in the Hearing Board's 84 page report, the Hearing Board found that Respondent, a solo practitioner who has concentrated his practice in real estate foreclosure matters since approximately 2008, engaged in the misconduct in his representation of clients in multiple matters.

In 2004 Respondent entered into business transactions with John LaRocque to purchase properties owned by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development

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("HUD") and then sell the properties for a profit. Respondent found the properties and did the legal work for the transactions and LaRocque provided most of the funding. Originally, Respondent and LaRocque formed a company, called JP Foundation, LLC, through which they purchased and sold the properties. In 2006, Respondent and LaRocque decided to invest in 11 additional properties, rehab them and then sell them. Again, Respondent handled all the paperwork and legal documents for the purchases and sales. LaRocque provided the loans to Respondent to purchase the properties. LaRocque did not want to retain an ownership interest in the properties but instead wanted to receive mortgages to secure his interest. LaRocque believed that Respondent was acting as his attorney with respect to these investments and believed Respondent would protect his interests. Respondent did not advise LaRocque to seek independent legal counsel.

One of the properties involved in this arrangement was located at 2720 West Warren Blvd. in Chicago ("Warren property"). On March 5, 2006, LaRocque loaned Respondent $385,000 to purchase the Warren property. Title to the Warren property remained in the name of Henry Tate, the then owner of the property. Respondent prepared mortgage documents and LaRocque received a mortgage on the property on March 25, 2006, with Tate as mortgagor. Respondent handled the closing on the property. Again, he did not tell LaRocque to seek independent counsel or advise him there was a conflict of interest. In April 2007, Respondent prepared a release of LaRocque's mortgage on the Warren property without telling LaRocque. Respondent testified he sought the release so that the Warren property could be refinanced and could then be rehabbed. The release purported to be signed by LaRocque and was notarized by Respondent.

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LaRocque testified he did not sign the release or give anyone permission to sign it. After LaRocque learned about the release, he confronted Respondent. Respondent then drafted and provided LaRocque with a demand note, according to which Respondent was personally liable to LaRocque for $265,000. The note was secured by a second mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Once again, Respondent did not advise LaRocque to seek independent counsel, advise him of the conflict of interest, or disclose in any detail his finances and ability to pay on the note.

Respondent made some payments on the note to LaRocque totaling $31,791.08. As of the hearing date, LaRocque was still trying to collect the remaining amount due on the note.

The Hearing Board concluded that Respondent violated the following Rules:

1. Rule 1.7(b)(1990) (representation of a client when the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests) by engaging in a conflict of interest, without consent, with respect to the 11 additional properties and with respect to the execution of the demand note and second mortgage;

2. Rule 1.8(a)(1)(1990)(entering into a business transaction with a client where the client and lawyer may have conflicting interests without consent after disclosure) by investing in the underdeveloped properties with LaRocque, obtaining a loan from LaRocque for the Warren property, and by negotiating the note and second mortgage, all without the proper disclosures or consent from LaRocque;

3. Rule 1.8(a)(2)(1990)(entering into a business transaction with a client where the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment for the protection of the client, without consent after disclosure) by investing in the underdeveloped properties, obtaining the loan and negotiating the note and second mortgage without making the proper disclosures;

4. Rule 8.4(a)(3)(committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects), by violating the Illinois Notary Act by not

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witnessing LaRocque's signature but notarizing the release of mortgage;

5. Rule 8.4(a)(4)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) by notarizing the release of mortgage when he knew LaRocque had not signed the release in his presence.

Before this Board, Respondent contends that he was acting as a business partner or investment partner with John LaRocque as opposed to acting as his lawyer. Consequently, Respondent argues that the Hearing Board's findings that he violated Rule 1.7 and 1.8 should be overturned.

We do not disturb the findings of fact made by the Hearing Board unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Cutright, 233 Ill. 2d 474, 488, 910 N.E. 2d 931 (2009). "A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Id. This deferential standard of review recognizes that the Hearing Board is in a better position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, judge credibility, and resolve conflicting evidence. Id.

LaRocque testified that he believed that Respondent was acting as his counsel in the transactions. Respondent admitted in his Answer to the Administrator's Complaint that LaRocque believed that Respondent was acting as his attorney and was protecting his interests. LaRocque's belief was reasonable. Respondent admittedly handled all of the legal work pertaining to the transactions. Accordingly, the Hearing Board's finding that Respondent was acting as LaRocque's attorney in the transactions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Given the conflict of interest, Respondent was obligated under Rule 1.7 to obtain his client's consent after disclosure and was obligated under Rule 1.8(a) to advise LaRocque to obtain independent counsel. See e.g., In re Sax, 03 CH 99 (Review Bd., Nov. 27, 2007), Respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions denied, No. M.R. 22139 (March 17, 2008).

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There is no evidence in the record that Respondent told LaRocque to obtain other counsel or that he disclosed the conflict and obtained consent. We therefore see no reason to disturb the Hearing Board's findings.

In addition, Respondent contends that he was improperly found to have "forged" LaRocque's signature on the release of the mortgage. Respondent is mistaken. He was only charged with engaging in criminal conduct by violating the Illinois Notary Act. The evidence supports that finding. LaRocque testified he did not sign the release; the Hearing Panel believed him and his testimony was corroborated by the testimony of his brother. Accordingly, Respondent could not have witnessed LaRocque's signature, and Respondent therefore violated the Illinois Notary Act. See, e.g., In re Forrest, 2011PR00011 (Review Bd., Aug. 22, 2013), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 26358 (Jan. 17, 2014)(this Board concluded that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) by improperly notarizing a quit claim deed).

When Respondent stopped paying on the note he executed as set forth in Count I above, LaRocque hired an attorney, Carl Poli, to attempt to collect the outstanding sums from Respondent. In December 2010, Wells Fargo Bank, the holder of the first mortgage on Respondent's personal residence, filed a foreclosure action against Respondent. LaRocque was named as a defendant because he held the second mortgage. Poli filed an appearance on behalf of LaRocque.

In July 2012, Respondent still had not repaid the note and Poli filed a motion for summary judgment to attempt to collect the amount owing to LaRocque. The motion was partially granted in the amount of $327,972.94, the amount due on the note with interest and penalties. The court set a date for a hearing to set attorney's fees for October 18, 2012.

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Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling but failed to provide notice of the motion to Poli. At the disciplinary hearing, Poli testified that Respondent often failed to serve him with documents. Respondent then filed a motion to extend time and again failed to give notice to Poli. He set the motion for a hearing on October 17, 2012 and Poli did not appear because he did not know about the hearing. When Respondent appeared in court on the motion, Respondent falsely told the court he had served Poli with the motions. When Respondent drafted the order, he removed the October 18 hearing on attorney's fees from the call. When Poli appeared in court the next day for the hearing, he told the court that he had not been served with Respondent's motions. The court reinstated the court date and entered judgment for attorney's fees for $25,325.

As a result of his lies to the court about service of the above motions, the Hearing Board concluded that Respondent knowingly made a false statement to a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1)(2010), engaged in dishonest conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c), and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of 8.4(d). These findings are supported by the evidence.

The Hearing Board found, by considering the testimony and by reviewing the documentary evidence, that Respondent represented, as an attorney, Peter Blythe ("Blythe") in the purchase and sale of at least four properties between September 2005 and April 2006. The settlement statements reflect Respondent's name as attorney for Blythe and reflect that he collected document preparation fees and other unspecified fees.

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In addition, Respondent had additional various personal financial interests in these four transactions ("the Blythe transactions"). For instance, he acted as title agent and attorney for the title company, Stewart Title, and issued title policies, for at least $8,000 in fees, in three of the four transactions. He also acted as a real estate broker through his real estate brokerage firm, Shelton & Associates, and received thousands of dollars in brokerage commissions in these transactions although at the time of two of the transactions, he had not yet incorporated the brokerage firm or received a real estate brokerage license.¹

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation ("IDFPR") initiated an investigation of Respondent that included an investigation of the Blythe transactions. With respect to these four transactions, the Illinois Real Estate Act provided that a real estate broker could be subject to discipline and fines for acting as a broker or salesperson in the same transaction in which the broker acts as attorney for either the buyer or seller. The attorney for the IDFPR, Craig Capilla, testified that there was no evidence that Respondent had made any disclosures to Blythe about the conflicts of interest in his various roles in these transactions. The IDFPR filed a complaint against Respondent alleging that he violated this provision of the Act with respect to these transactions. When Respondent did not respond to the allegations, a default order was entered. On September 27, 2011, the IDFPR indefinitely suspended Respondent's license as a real estate broker and fined him $25,000.

As a result of Respondent's dual roles, the Hearing Board concluded that in three of the four transactions, Respondent acted as an attorney for Blythe while also acting as a title agent and/or real estate broker. Consequently, Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b)(1990) by representing a client when the representation was materially limited by the lawyer's own interests. In addition, the Hearing Board concluded that Respondent engaged in dishonest

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conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4)(1990) by receiving brokerage commissions in two of the transactions before he had received his real estate brokerage license.

While Respondent contends that he violated no Rules by acting as a broker and an attorney in the same transactions, the Court has previously disciplined attorneys for accepting similar dual roles. In In re Kaeding, 03 CH 30, petition for discipline on consent allowed, No. M.R. 19208 (March 12, 2004), the Court imposed a ninety day suspension for a conflict of interest in a real estate transaction where the lawyer represented a party to the transaction and was also the real estate broker. In In re Berry, 05 CH 126, petition for discipline on consent allowed, No. M.R. 21073 (Sept. 21, 2006), the attorney was disciplined for acting as the real estate agent, attorney and agent of the title company in the same transaction. Finally, in In re Marshall, 2010PR00129 (July 24, 2013), Respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions denied, No. M.R. 26312 (Jan. 27, 2014), the attorney was suspended for six months and until he refunded the commission fees to the client in part for engaging in a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7(b) by acting as an attorney for the seller where his spouse was the real estate broker. We therefore affirm the Hearing Board's findings that Respondent violated Rules 1.7(b) and 8.4(a)(4).

The IDFPR reported Respondent's conduct in the Blythe transactions to the ARDC in late November 2011. The Administrator sent letters to Respondent asking him for information and documents. Respondent failed to answer the requests. In late January 2012, the Administrator issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Respondent's appearance in the offices of the ARDC on February 29, 2012. Respondent failed to appear or produce the requested

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documents. At the time this matter was voted by an Inquiry Panel in April 2013, Respondent still had not complied with the Administrator's requests. As a result of Respondent's failure to comply with the requests for information, the Hearing Board concluded Respondent violated Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d). These findings are supported by the evidence.

In 2006, Respondent failed to register with the ARDC or pay the annual registration fee until April 18, 2006. Accordingly, pursuant to the Rule 756, on February 6, 2006 the Administrator removed Respondent's name from the Roll of Attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois. From February 6 to April 17, Respondent represented Blythe in four real transactions as noted above. On February 10, 2006, he represented Janis Tassone in a real estate transaction and on March 26, 2006 he represented John LaRocque in a real estate transaction. Respondent admitted in his Answer to the Administrator's Complaint that he did not inform these clients of his removal from the Master Roll but stated he did not know he wasn't registered. The Hearing Board concluded that his misconduct was not excused by his ignorance and found that he violated Rule 5.5(a) by practicing law without a license. We see no reason to disturb the Hearing Board's findings.

The Administrator alleged misconduct with respect to Respondent's representation, between August 2009 and February 2012, of nine different homeowners in defending foreclosure actions filed against them and/or in seeking loan modifications for them. While each of the representations outlined in the allegations of this Count is unique, certain facts surrounding the representations are similar. Respondent met initially with the clients. He had the

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clients sign an agreement that his law firm would "waive its customary $4,000 upfront classic retainer." The agreement then stated that the client would then agree to pay a non-refundable monthly sum and that he would continue to work on the file. The fees were deducted from the clients' bank accounts automatically. There was no end date to the monthly payments. In addition, Respondent asked for and received money for costs of approximately $300-$500. Respondent deposited all fees and costs into his business account; he had no client trust account. He testified he paid any court costs out of his business account.

Throughout his representation in the nine matters, Respondent withdrew the monthly fees whether or not he performed any services. The total fees paid by the clients varied from a low of $1,100 to a high of $19,200. Respondent did not give any refunds of any unearned fees or costs.

The Hearing Board found that Respondent performed a limited amount of work and sometimes no work on behalf of the clients. We need not repeat the facts of each of the nine representations, as the Hearing Board thoroughly recited the evidence in its Report. We will use the matter of Respondent's representation of Nadine and Walter Grice as illustrative of Respondent's misconduct in the nine foreclosure matters. The Grices retained Respondent in February 2012 to defend a foreclosure action filed against them and to obtain a loan modification of their mortgage on their home. They initially paid Respondent $900, which was to include $300 for Respondent's costs, and signed a fee agreement to have $600 a month debited from their bank account and sent to Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent never communicated with the Grices, although he received the $600 a month in fees. The Grices were unable to determine if Respondent was doing any work. In December 2012, the Grices received a notice of sale for the home. On December 20, 2012, they sent a letter to Respondent terminating his services and

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advising Respondent that they had checked the records of their case and had learned that Respondent had never filed an appearance on their behalf. They requested a refund of $4500 and a return of their documents; they never received a refund of their fees or costs.

While the other eight matters are not identical to the Grice matter, in each of the matters, the client expressed an inability to obtain information or services from Respondent and frustration at obtaining little, if any, relief despite paying Respondent hefty fees, particularly given their precarious financial situations. Most of the clients testified that they did not talk to Respondent after the initial meeting and that Respondent did not respond to their requests for information. Respondent did not provide any documents or billing statements to the clients documenting any work performed on behalf of the clients. In some of the cases, it appears Respondent appeared in foreclosure actions on behalf of the clients, but in some of the matters he failed to appear at scheduled court hearings or client meetings. Respondent's testimony as to his services was vague?he testified generally that he took steps to delay the foreclosure proceedings or stave off an eviction so his clients could stay in their homes, but provided few details about each client's matter.

The Hearing Board concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.3 by failing to file appearances in two of the nine matters, including the Grice matter, and by missing court dates and client meetings in most of the other matters. The Hearing Board also found that Respondent violated Rule 1.4 by failing to adequately communicate with most of the clients outlined in this Count, failing to return the clients' phone calls, and by failing to update the clients as the status of their matters, including in a couple of matters where the clients' houses were put up for sale. While the evidence regarding some of the representations was vague and uncorroborated, the Hearing Board relied on the clients' testimony in reaching a conclusion that Respondent violated

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these Rules with respect to at least some of the clients. The Hearing Board was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, including Respondent, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Hearing Board. While Respondent disputes the findings that he failed to provide services to these nine clients, he points to no evidence in the record that the Hearing Board ignored. We find that their conclusions that Respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4 were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Hearing Board also found that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 by charging and collecting unreasonable fees. With respect to the violation of Rule 1.5, the Hearing Board found that Respondent charged an unreasonable fee because, without explanation to the clients, the monthly fee was taken whether or not Respondent performed any services and because there was no end date to the fees. The Hearing Board's discussion in the Report concerning Respondent's violation of Rule 1.5 is unnecessarily convoluted, in our view. We agree with Respondent that he could have entered into agreements with his clients to receive a fee, payable in monthly installments. Such an agreement would not necessarily require that Respondent actually perform services each month. However, the problem with Respondent's fee agreement is that there was no end date to the fees. The clients had no way of determining the total fee they were paying Respondent.

More importantly, Respondent did little to no work to justify the fees he took. The Hearing Board found that the fees were unreasonable pursuant to Rule 1.5 in light of the minimal services provided by Respondent. The Hearing Board considered the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 and concluded, "[W]e are convinced the work performed by Respondent on behalf of his clients in no way justified the fees received." We give deference to this finding by The Hearing Board. While Respondent argues that other attorneys charge similar fees, he provided no evidence in

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support of his claims, and his argument ignores the other factors considered by the Hearing Board in reaching a determination that Respondent violated the Rule. We conclude that the Hearing Board's finding that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Finally, the Hearing Board concluded that Respondent violated Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(c) by depositing the money received for costs and/or expenses in an account that was not a client fund account; violated Rule 1.16(a)(3) by failing to withdraw in two of the matters after being discharged; and violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to return his unearned fees. The evidence supports these findings and we see no basis to disturb them.

In July 2012 and August 2012 the Administrator sent letters to Respondent requesting information relative to investigations into Respondent's representation of Hector Nunez and Lisa Malkinski, two of the clients named in Count VI of the Administrator's Complaint. Respondent responded on August 8, 2012. On October 22, the Administrator sent Respondent a subpoena duces tecum requesting production of Respondent's client files. Respondent received the letter but failed to produce any documents in response to the subpoena.

At hearing, Respondent claimed that in February 2013 the DuPage County States Attorney executed a search warrant on his office and took his computer and documents including part of the Nunez file. The Hearing Board noted that Respondent provided the sole evidence of the warrant or what may have been confiscated. Further, the Board found that any such warrant did not affect Respondent's ability to respond to the subpoena prior to February 2013. The Hearing Board concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing to respond to a lawful

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demand for information from a disciplinary authority. Again, we see no need to disturb this finding.

Respondent failed to produce documents relating to his representation of Demetrios and Lillian Paschal despite requests by the Administrator to do so. In February 2013, the Administrator issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring Respondent to appear and produce his file on February 27, 2013. Respondent sent a file to counsel for the Administrator on February 23, 2013, but he failed to appear for his sworn statement on February 27, 2013. He never attempted to reschedule an appearance. The Hearing Board concluded Respondent violated Rule 8.1 and we uphold this finding.

In determining the appropriate sanction recommendation, we consider the nature of the misconduct charged and proved, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances shown by the evidence. In re Gorecki, 208 Ill. 2d 350, 360-61, 802 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (2003). In addition, this Board may consider whether the sanction will "help preserve public confidence in the legal profession." In re Twohey, 191 Ill. 2d 75, 85, 727 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (2000).

Respondent's misconduct was egregious, spanned a number of years, and involved multiple clients. As found by the Hearing Board, Respondent took advantage of vulnerable clients and charged them unreasonable fees while they were in the process of losing their homes and then he neglected their matters and failed to represent many of them with the diligence we expect from members of the bar. He engaged in conflicts of interest with no true consideration of his obligations to his clients. He lied to a court. He engaged in dishonesty by notarizing a document without witnessing the signature. He repeatedly put his own interests

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ahead of his obligations to others. He repeatedly failed to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, failed to cooperate with the ARDC, and failed to follow the rules in his own disciplinary proceeding.

The Hearing Board found that there were numerous factors that aggravated Respondent's very serious misconduct. Many of the clients testified that their dealings with Respondent burdened them financially, compounded the stress they were already facing, and negatively affected their view of attorneys. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had not paid John LaRocque the remaining amount owing to him, he had not paid the $25,000 fine imposed by the IDFPR, and he had not returned any of his unearned fees or costs to his clients. We are particularly troubled by Respondent's complete inability to acknowledge or appreciate the wrongfulness of his misdeeds.

The Hearing Board relied on a number of cases where the Court has imposed the sanction of a lengthy suspension or disbarment for misconduct that was extensive and serious. See, e.g., In re Levin, 101 Ill.2d 535, 463 N.E.2d 715 (1984)(suspension of three years and until further order of the Court for engaging in a pattern of neglect and misrepresentations to clients); In re Tarsa, 99 CH 23 (Hearing Bd., Jan. 12, 2000), approved and confirmed, No. M.R. 16654 (May 17, 2000)(disbarment for conduct that included conflicts of interest, conversions, dishonesty and neglect).

We give deference to the Hearing Board's reasoned analysis of the proper sanction recommendation to impose in light of the purposes of discipline. Given the extensive serious misconduct and the factors in aggravation, we agree with the Hearing Board's recommendation.

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 We affirm the findings of fact and the findings of misconduct of the Hearing Board. We recommend to the Court that Paul Leslie Shelton be disbarred.

I, Kenneth G. Jablonski, Clerk of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois and keeper of the records, hereby certifies that the foregoing is a true copy of the Report and Recommendation of the Review Board, approved by each Panel member, entered in the above entitled cause of record filed in my office on September 14, 2015.

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