

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

-----◆◆◆-----
James Obergefell, et al., Petitioners

v.

Richard Hodges, Dir., Ohio Department of Health, et al.

-----◆-----
Valeria Tanco, et al., Petitioners

v.

Bill Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, et al.

-----◆-----
April DeBoer, et al., Petitioners

v.

Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, et al.

-----◆-----
Gregory Bourke, et al., Petitioners

v.

Steve Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, et al.

-----◆-----
*On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals For the Sixth Circuit*

**AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF GORDON WAYNE WATTS, IN
SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY: FAVOURS STATES' LAWS,
BUT SUPPORTIVE OF MANY PETITIONER GRIEVANCES**

Gordon Wayne Watts, *Amicus Curiae**

<http://GordonWatts.com> / <http://GordonWayneWatts.com>

821 Alicia Road, Lakeland, Florida 33801-2113

H: (863) 688-9880 ; W: 863-686-3411 ; 863-687-6141

E-mail: gww1210@aol.com ; gww1210@gmail.com

Gordon W. Watts, PRO SE / PRO PER, *in persona propria*

[[Note: put lawyer's name here, instead of mine.]]

* Watts, acting counsel of record, is not a lawyer. **Per
RULE 34.1(f), Watts, appearing *pro se*, is listed.**

Rule 20 Motion to waive Rule 37 for Good Cause

[Note: this is not needed if I get a lawyer; to remove]

Amicus, with “blanket permission” of petitioners and respondents, in *DeBoer, supra*, to participate, hereby seeks leave to waive Rule 37 for Good Cause, and sets out these facts and law in support thereof:

(1) The only thing that prohibits Watts' brief from “automatic acceptance” is the fact that he's in very deep Credit Card debt (read: qualifies for *in forma pauperis*), due to the huge service & printing costs associated with his participation as an Amicus by right & with consent in *Brenner v. Armstrong* and *Grimsley v. Armstrong*, Nos. 14-14061, 14-14066, (11th Cir., 2014, perfected), and thus can't afford to hire a lawyer to “rubber-stamp” the instant brief, as Rule 37 requires. [See: **Apx. A-D**]

(2) Watts' amicus in *Brenner/Grimsley* was accepted for review; and, when Watts & another litigant both moved to submit out-of-time filings, while the other litigant's motion was DENIED, Watts' motion to amend was GRANTED, implying Watts has potential to contribute to *DeBoer, et al.* [Cf: **Apx. E**]

(3) Watts nearly won the landmark 'Terri Schiavo' case –all by himself (doing better than both Gov. Bush and Schiavo's blood family), despite not being a lawyer. This implies that he might know enough about law to not be a waste of your time. [**Apx. F-H**]

(4) Rule 37 is inconsistent with R.12.6, which entitles all parties to lower ct proceedings to file in this court, and not just lawyers accepted to This Court's bar.

(5) The 1st, 5th, 9th, & 14th Am's. are implicated in denial of a way for a poor litigant (such as myself) to participate: **Thus, I move This Court, for good cause, to issue “all writs necessary” to aid your jurisdiction.**

Questions Presented

1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?

Amicus¹ Statement & RULE 29 Disclosure

I'm keenly aware of Rule 37.1's common sense standard: **"1. An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court."** While I haven't reviewed all of the *DeBoer* briefs, I reviewed EVERY SINGLE merits brief in our sister circuit where I'm an amicus: As the legal reporter for *The Register*, I did coverage on the 11th Cir. 'Gay Marriage' Cases: www.GordonWatts.com/DOCKET-GayMarriageCase.html and: www.GordonWayneWatts.com/DOCKET-GayMarriageCase.html

Thus, I can assure you that I bring unique arguments not advanced by anyone else, & thus may be of considerable help to This Court.

¹Appellants & appellees filed blanket letters of consent to amici briefs in support of either or neither party in *DeBoer*. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or part, nor did anyone make any monetary contribution intended to subsidise/fund preparation/submission of this brief. I, Gordon Wayne Watts, alone, both wrote & funded it. I'm an individual, not a corporation, & thus neither issue stock nor have a parent corporation or any publicly held corporations that own 10 percent or more of stock of that nonexistent parent corporation.

Table of Contents

[Note: If I get lawyer, the R.20 motion's not needed.]

Cover page.....	1
Rule 20 Motion to waive Rule 37 for Good Cause.....	2
Questions Presented.....	3
Amicus Statement & RULE 29 Disclosure.....	3
Table of Contents.....	(a)
Table of Citations / Authorities.....	(b) - (d)
Interest of the Amicus Curiae.....	4

Argument

I. Polygamy has more legal precedent than gay marriage, implicating equal protection.....	5-10
II.(A) prejudice is wrong ((A)) prejudice against homosexuals (gays) is wrong:.....	10-13
II.(B) prejudice is wrong ((B)) prejudice against heterosexuals (straight people) is wrong:.....	13-15
III. A solution: separating the treatment (e.g., mistreatment) of persons from the marriage status, and, instead, link 2 similar marital statii (gay unions and polygamy) for a more accurate assessment.	15-16
IV. Application of: <i>Baker</i> , <i>Romer</i> , <i>Lawrence</i> , <i>Lofton</i> , and <i>Windsor</i>	16-20
V. Correcting common errors of 'Traditional Marriage' advocates.....	20-22
VI. Proposed order.....	22-24
VII. Inferior Federal Courts didn't even have jurisdiction to address 'Gay Marriage' dispute...	24-26
VIII. Conclusion.....	26-29

Appendices

Apx. A: Debt Statement showing I can't afford lawyer	
Apx. B-C: Selected receipts showing 11 th Cir. costs	
Apx. D: Food Stamp certification, verifying poverty	
Apx. E: Selected Order of the Court granting motion	
Apx. F-H: Documentation of my near-win re <i>Schiavo</i>	

(a)

Table of Citations / Authorities

Cases:

<u><i>Arizonans for official English and Robert D. Park, Petitioners v. ARIZONA et al.</i></u> , 520 U.S. 43, at Syllabus 23, note 11.....	25
<u><i>Baker v. Nelson</i></u> , 409 U.S. 810, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972).....	16-19, 22
<u><i>Ballard v. United States</i></u> , 329 U.S. 187, 193, 67 S. Ct. 261, 264 (1946).....	24
<u><i>Brenner v. Armstrong</i></u> , Nos. 14-14061, (11th Cir., 2014, perfected).....	a, 19-20
<u><i>Bowers v. Hardwick</i></u> , 478 U.S. 186 (1986).....	17-18
<u><i>Doe v. Pryor</i></u> , 344 F.3d. 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003)..	24
<u><i>Dred Scott v. John F. Sanford</i></u> , 15 L.Ed. 691; 19 How. 393; 60 US 393 at 407.....	21
<u><i>Fla. Dept. of Children and Families v. In re: Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G.</i></u> , Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D08-3044, Opinion filed September 22, 2010.....	23
<u><i>Grimsley v. Armstrong</i></u> , Nos. 14-14066, (11th Cir., 2014, perfected).....	a, 19-20
<u><i>Hicks v. Miranda</i></u> , 422 U.S. 332, 344.....	17
<u><i>In Re: Gordon Wayne Watts (as next friend of Theresa Marie 'Terri' Schiavo)</i></u> , No. SC03-2420 (Fla. Feb.23, 2003),.....	2
<u><i>In Re: Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida, et al. v. Michael Schiavo, Guardian: Theresa Schiavo</i></u> , No. SC04-925 (Fla. Oct.21, 2004).....	2
<u><i>Lawrence v. Texas</i></u> , 539 U. S. 558, 599 (2003).....	5, 16-19, 23
<u><i>Lofton v. Sec. of the Dept. of Children and Family Services</i></u> , 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).....	17, 19

(b)

Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976).....13
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. at 164 (1878)).....22
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).....19, 27
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo,
403 F.3d 1223, 2005 WL 648897 (11th Cir. Mar.23,
2005).....2
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147,
60 S. Ct. 879, 882 (1940).....24
U.S. v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).....19-20

Constitutional Provisions:

Am.1, U.S. Const.....2
Am.5, U.S. Const.....2
Am.9, U.S. Const.....2
Am.10, U.S. Const.....24-25
Am.14, U.S. Const.....2-3, 22, 27-28
Equal Protection.....4, *passim*

Briefs:

“Brief of Amicus Curiae David Boyle in Support of Neither Party,” brief at page 5, DeBoer v. Snyder, 14-571, cert. accepted to the U.S. Supreme Court.6-8, 15

“JOINT INITIAL BRIEF OF ALL APPELLANTS” (Brenner v. Armstrong, 14-14061, and Grimsley v. Armstrong, 11th Cir. 2014, perfected, brief of appellants at page 7),.....20-22

“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law,” authored by Atty. Daniel Boaz Tilley, of the ACLU, Grimsley v. Armstrong, 14-14066, 11th Cir. 2014.....10

Response brief of Timothy B. Bostic et al., authored by David Boies, Theodore Olson, et al., brief, page 18, *Michèle b. McQuigg v. Timothy B. Bostic, et al.*, no. 14-251.....5-6

Other Materials:

DOMA (The Federal “Defense of Marriage Act”).....20

“ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN COUNSELING SAME-SEX COUPLES” (legal memorandum) by George D. Karibjanian and Jeffrey R. Dollinger.....11-12

Judeo-Christian Holy Bible.....6

The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act (37th United States Congress, Sess. 2., ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501; signed into law: July 8, 1862)).....5

RULE 12.6, U.S. Supreme Court.....a

RULE 20, U.S. Supreme Court.....a

Rule 24(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.....4

RULE 34.1(f), U.S. Supreme Court.....1, 29

RULE 37, U.S. Supreme Court.....a, b

Various Official ISLAM authorities.....8

(d)

Interest of the Amicus Curiae

(I) I wish to be a peacemaker & help warring parties come to consensus agreeable to all, without any having to compromise its values, *if possible*. (II) Secondly, as a heterosexual (straight) person, who may one day marry, I'm negatively impacted by ramifications of the "definition of marriage": There are numerous "Marriage Penalties": for example, married people who collect disability, retirement, or Social Security, have benefits reduced due to the status of being 'married' even if their financial status didn't change. This is discriminatory, and a violation of Equal Protection, since an arbitrary standard penalises a person for no compelling reason. The "marriage penalty," as used in this context, refers not only to higher taxes required from some married couples that wouldn't be required by two otherwise identical single people with exactly the same income, but also to a loss of certain financial benefits, such as those listed *supra*. (III) Additionally, there exist some (albeit weak) legal justification to grant a motion to intervene: Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) entitles a person to intervene as of right if the person "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless the existing parties adequately represent that interest." The financial interests lost by the "Marriage Penalty" satisfy this standard; however, this amicus brief should suffice to grant due process, making moot such intervention, & making it unlikely such a motion would (or should) be granted.

Argument

I. Polygamy has more legal precedent than gay marriage, implicating equal protection

Polygamy is currently illegal according to Federal Law: The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, signed into law on July 8, 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln, is still the “Law of the Land,” and has not been overturned. However: While polygamy has been “bandied about” in other cases, it has not been properly used as an Equal Protection argument. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissent, compared same-sex marriage with polygamy, in claiming that “the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve” either. (*Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U. S. 558, 599 (2003) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) But he did not specifically ask why Gay Marriage is legal if the other, more-accepted norm (polygamy), is not! Also, one brief, recently stated:

- “Clerk McQuigg nevertheless argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision “creat[es] a boundless fundamental right to marry” that will require States to “recogniz[e] as marriages many close relationships that they currently exclude (such as polygamous, polyamorous, and incestuous relationships).” Pet. 14–15. But while the government has no legitimate interest in prohibiting marriage between individuals of the same sex, there are weighty government interests underlying these other restrictions, including preventing the birth of genetically

- compromised children produced through incestuous relationships and ameliorating the risk of spousal and child abuse that courts have found is often associated with polygamous relationships.” (RESPONSE BRIEF OF TIMOTHY B. BOSTIC ET AL., *Michèle B. McQuigg v. Timothy B. Bostic, et al.*, No. 14-251, U.S.Sup.Ct., brief authored by DAVID BOIES, Theodore Olson, et al., brief, page 18)

While I do accept polygamy is something that should be outlawed, I do not for one second accept that it has “more” child abuse, and further find the comparison to incest (with its inherent genetic issues) to be a bad (and insulting) comparison.

Likewise, Atty. David Boyle, in his jurisdictional brief, in *DeBoer*, makes a similar comment “that small-group polygamy is a rough equivalent of gay marriage.” (brief at page 5). This is a good 'Slippery Slope' argument, but his legal analysis only puts polygamy on equal ground with Gay Marriage, and this, while close, is still incorrect; the correct descriptor is 'less,' not 'equal.'

Polygamy has a rich historical precedent, dating back to “Bible days,” of ancient Israel. Even putting aside religious books (the Bible), we see many far-east nations have practiced polygamy in both ancient times –as well as modern times. Recently, in America, Mormons (formally: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) practiced plural marriages. Even at present, many Muslim and African countries accept polygamous marriages. However, the little history relating to gay

marriages is generally negative (Sodom and Gomorrah in religious writings of Jews and Christians; as well as stoning & the death penalty among many modern-day Muslim and African nations). Even in America, we have never had a history of polygamist unions being acceptable –or legal.

The statement that Gay Marriage has much less historical precedent is not meant to be insulting to gays: It is what it is.

In fact, some religious and historical precedent would hold that polygamy (like divorce) was “permitted” for the hardness of mankind's heart (evil weakness to his lower carnal nature and base desires), but was not lawful in the “original” game plan:

- 8 He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. [Matthew 19:7, Holy Bible, KJV]
- 2 And Pharisees came up and in order to test him asked, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?” 3 He answered them, “What did Moses command you?” 4 They said, “Moses allowed a man to write a certificate of divorce and to send her away.” 5 And Jesus said to them, “Because of your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment. 6 But from the beginning of creation, ‘God made them male and female.’ [Matt. 10:2-6, Holy Bible, ESV]
- Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh. [Genesis 2:24, Holy Bible, KJV]

Genesis, chapter 19; I Corinthians 6:9; and, I Timothy 1:10, in the Christian Holy Bible, discuss homosexual unions in negative light. These passages are quoted for historical precedent, not to advance any particular religion, especially since this amicus brief cites Muslim sources which say the same:

* “Why does Islam forbid lesbianism and homosexuality?” <http://IslamQA.info/en/10050>

* “Islam is clear in its prohibition of homosexual acts.” Homosexuality in Islam: What does Islam say about homosexuality
<http://islam.about.com/od/islamsays/a/homosexuality.htm>

* “According to a pamphlet produced by Al-Fatiha, there is a consensus among Islamic scholars that all humans are naturally heterosexual. 5 Homosexuality is seen by scholars to be a sinful and perverted deviation from the norm. All Islamic schools of thought and jurisprudence consider gay acts to be unlawful. They differ in terms of penalty” – Islam and Homosexuality
<http://www.MissionIslam.com/knowledge/homosexuality.htm>

Even putting aside the “religious” views of homosexuality and the requisite historical precedent, nonetheless, the legal precedent is clear: Plural Marriages are illegal –and have been for ages.

Atty. Boyle was “close, but no cigar”: Same-sex unions are less legal than plural marriage, not equally legal.

The implications of this are astounding – and This Court has only four (4) options, none of which are pleasant, but here they are:

(1) Since Gay Marriage has less historical precedent than Polygamy (not more), and the latter is illegal, then one solution would be to make Gay Marriage even more illegal –and prevent it – by Federal Law (read: The Supremacy Clause) – from any state in the union: This option (both are illegal) would satisfy Equal Protection (but probably not satisfy Gay Rights advocates).

(2) Since Gay Marriage has less historical precedent than Polygamy (not more), and the latter is illegal, then an “alternate” solution would be to make both types of unions LEGAL: This option (both are legal) would satisfy Equal Protection (but probably not pass the “straight face” test with the American Public!).

(3) Since Gay Marriage has less historical precedent than Polygamy (not more), and the latter is illegal, then allowing Gay Marriage while denying Polygamy would be a clear and present violation of Federal Equal Protection. Now that I've “let the cat out the bag” and “spilled the beans” on the disparate treatment constituting a valid Equal Protection violation, you can expect that picking option #3, here, would alienate hoards of practicing polygamists nation-wide, and they would use your ruling as “a hammer” to achieve legal polygamy –and bring a bad name to This Court for an imprudent ruling.

(4) The 4th and last option would be to allow Polygamy while denying Gay Marriage. This option would not violate Equal Protection (since rational

grounds could be used to differentiate between the 2 types of marriage), but I don't think anyone would accept that option 4, here, would be tenable.

The conclusion to Argument I, here, is unpleasant, but the best of 4 difficult options is clearly the first option: Of the three options that don't violate Equal Protection (all of them except the 3rd), Option (#1) is the “least painful” one.

II. PREJUDICE IS WRONG

((A)) Prejudice against homosexuals (gays) is wrong: The arguments of the “PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW,” authored by Atty. Daniel Boaz Tilley, of the ACLU, in the *Grimsley* case, cited in the Rule 20 motion, *supra*, are incorporated by reference herein as if fully set forth herein. However, let me highlight just a few to recap, as it bears repeating:

(1) Sloan Grimsley is a firefighter, who is in a homosexual relationship with Joyce Albu. What if Sloan is killed in the line of duty? Well, if Albu were a man, then Grimsley's insurance policy would cover her. But it does not. While this amicus brief frowns upon “Gay Marriage” recognition, this writer realises the dishonour involved in Grimsley paying into an insurance policy –with “equal” dollars as those in “traditional” marriage –but having her dollars devalued: Grimsley can NOT gain the same “value” from her work-related life insurance as those similarly-situated firefighters who are in heterosexual (straight) marriages. While this writer opposes such lifestyles, he can not accept what amounts to (and legally constitutes) a violation of

Equal Protection –and probably of Contract Law: The Contract may have been misleading, and it definitely is “unequal” in its protection of citizens' rights to be treated equally. [Clearly, you can see where I am going with this: The Life Insurance policy should depend only on the monies paid in (and not on 'homosexual,' 'married,' or 'single' status), and should allow Grimsley to appoint anyone as a beneficiary –say, a Grandmother –a neighbor, even a group people: This would allow her Life Insurance policy to be unimpeded, and thus prevent any claims that the Fla. Marriage Law discriminates.]

(2) What about people who want visitation rights in a hospital? Shouldn't their rights to visit be predicated solely on whether or not they pose a threat to the patient? If I, Gordon Wayne Watts, can visit a total stranger at a local hospital, why should a “Gay Person” be jerked around? ANSWER: A gay person should be denied visitation ONLY if he/she poses some sort of danger –or, if for example, the patient (or the guardian of said patient, with legal authority) wishes no visitation –the same standard that applies to the general public (most of whom are straight).

(3) A legal memorandum, titled “ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN COUNSELING SAME-SEX COUPLES,” by George D. Karibjanian, Boca Raton, Florida and Jeffrey R. Dollinger, Gainesville, Florida, points out that other rights, such as ownership of real property in Florida by a married same-sex couple as tenants in common, as joint tenants with right of survivorship, or Tenants By The Entirety are affected based on the “status” of one's marriage (whether it is legally recognised by State Law or

not).

(4) Arlene Goldberg's "same sex marriage" wife, Carol Goldwasser (married under NY laws) could not be recognised as Carol's surviving spouse on her death certificate. I was moved by this loss; however, this example is different than the preceding three: As much as I sympathise with Goldberg, she did not actually lose anything (any more than were I, for example, to be married without the blessings of State Recognition: indeed, many societies have marriage as a separate function without government involvement at all!).

(5) One other point bears addressing: There must be a distinction made between "Gay Orientation" and "Gay Lifestyle": When one is "gay," that might mean 2 different things. On the one hand, a person has little or no choice over whether they are "gay" or not (in orientation, that is, preference). – Orientation is not totally genetically-controlled, since we see identical twins with different orientations, and many reports of straight people becoming gay – or gay people becoming straight. In fact, this writer, while having always been straight, has noticed his "orientation" change regarding what things are attractive in women. So, while "sexual orientation" is not totally genetic, it is safe to say that no one, knowing the discrimination in society, "chooses to be gay": Indeed, it should seem obvious that no one would purposely choose to "be gay." So, while a 'gay lifestyle' may, indeed, be harmful, in like manner as adultery, polygamy, or even –say –overeating, we must NOT be hateful towards others because they are "struggling" with something: For, we all are human, and have weaknesses, and want help –or at

least, patience and understanding –and kind and respectful treatment. While we can't “totally” legislate morality, we must legislate it as much as possible (outlawing murder, for example), and even when laws are “silent” on an issue, we must still strive to show love and courtesy towards all others—as we would like shown—but remembering that everyone is different, and some people need more understanding or room in certain weak areas than others—but each of us is 'weak' in different areas. [Since homosexuality is not totally genetic, of course, it would not be “discrete” nor “immutable,” and thus not a suspect class under *Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976), and thus not subject to heightened scrutiny—for this –and other –reasons.]

((B)) Prejudice against heterosexuals (straight people) is wrong: As stated supra, the “Marriage Penalty” penalises straight people, based solely on marital “status,” in things such as disability, retirement, and even higher taxes required from some married couples that would not be required by two otherwise identical single people with exactly the same income. This, too, is wrong. I would add this, however: If 'Gay Marriage' becomes legal in America, then homosexuals would be victims of the self-same “Marriage Penalties” described in this brief—and that is unjust, morally wrong, and (as it applies to law) certainly unconstitutional –and thus to be avoided. However, one more things needs to be considered: When people encounter a penalty for being married, some will live together, but refuse to get married, in order to avoid the reduction in benefits, disability, etc. Others, however, might get

married simply to obtain “spousal survivor-ship” benefits, and not because they love one another. **Lest This Court think I am making this up, I will testify that,** I, Amicus, Gordon Wayne Watts, know of one such friend who “lives in sin” with his girlfriend, according to his religion, and refuses to get married to her, simply because his disability will 'go down' if he gets married. He has told me this, and I believe it.

Thus, the interference in the “Free Will” choices for people to get married, divorced, or abstain, have “interference in the Free Market,” by the use of tax dollars. This causes bad marriages (or prevents good ones), *and also* wastes tax dollars to do so! (The claims that 'tax dollars' are used to 'promote' “traditional marriage,” while well-meaning, actually accomplish just the opposite! However, if the State Laws of all four states in the U.S. 6th Circuit are upheld, establishing the definition of marriage as solely “1 man and 1 woman,” this will be a safer (& cost less tax dollars) way to promote marriage, with its diverse benefits of gender-diversity, procreation, 2-parent teamwork, etc.)

One last things needs to be addressed, here: Some have said that in adoption, gays are discriminated against. While this amicus is against “gay adoption bans” (many gays make fine parents in many cases!), it would be legally-inconsistent to fail to promote “1-man, 1-woman” marriage: Single persons, for example, can adopt, but they are disfavoured, in comparison to “traditional marriage” families, and so, telling gays couples (or even polygamist families with plural marriages) that they, too, are disfavoured, is not inconsistent with how we treat singles, which we do for a “compelling state

interest,” and thus not genuine discrimination. So, it is indeed not a false claim to assert that “straight” nuclear families (e.g., 1 man and 1 woman) experience discrimination when gay unions are put on the same level in this regard.

The conclusion to this sub-argument is plain: While, in some matters, gays and straights must be treated equally (for example, ability to name anyone as a beneficiary in a life-insurance policy, and not just an “opposite sex” spouse!), in other areas, there are compelling states' interests to perhaps differentiate slightly. This is alluded or hinted at in Boyle's brief (pp.19-20ff, and *passim*), where he discusses different levels of “scrutiny,” in differing situations, but here, I “flesh it out” for clarity, as to why, exactly, it is a sound legal standard.

III. A SOLUTION: SEPARATING THE TREATMENT (E.G., MISTREATMENT) OF PERSONS FROM THE MARRIAGE STATUS, AND, INSTEAD, LINK 2 SIMILAR MARITAL STATII (GAY UNIONS AND POLYGAMY) FOR A MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT.

That title was a bit long, but needed such to be descriptive—First, here's the problem: We are linking “status” with “treatment,” and either way, society loses: If, on the one hand, you legalise gay marriage, then this “turns Equal Protection on its head,” and makes polygamy de facto legal: why not have polygamy legal, if something even LESS accepted is legal? (This outcome is bad.) On the other hand, if This Honourable Court upholds the 6th Circuit's decision and definition of marriage (which I

favour doing), then we might have gays (and straights—in some cases) being mistreated –and become “2nd-class” citizens. (This is also bad.)

Now, here's the (obvious) solution: Why not “remove” the link between “status” and “treatment,” and, instead, create a “link” between Polygamy and Gay Marriage? Since Gay Marriage has even less historical and legal precedent, then, in ALL scenarios, it must be accorded LESS protection, lest we run afoul of Equal Protection. But, as we see above, this would only subject Gay Marriage violators to the same penalties as those who practice polygamy, and we have not rejected that, now have we? No! America still frowns upon—and prosecutes those who practice polygamy –our “fellow-straight” people, and yet no one makes outcry, and with good reason: it is morally and legally sound logic.

IV. Application of: *Baker, Romer, Lawrence, Lofton, and Windsor*

Many briefs (defendants, plaintiffs, and amici) have discussed these cases, so it would be remiss of me to fail to address their application, in summary:

Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972) was decided when the case came to the Supreme Court through mandatory appellate review (not certiorari); therefore, its dismissal constituted a decision on the merits and established *Baker* as precedent. Though the extent of its precedential effect has been subject to debate (and ignored by several US appellate circuits), it remains binding case law on the point of Gay Marriage: only the U.S. Supreme Court may overrule its own decisions.

There are commonly “doctrinal development” arguments made to argue that *Baker* was *de facto* overturned, [e.g., “[I]f the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise[.]” *Hicks v. Miranda*, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)], but is this really the case?

Some proponents of the 'doctrinal development' arguments for overturning *Baker* cite to such as *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which criminalised sodomy. They sometimes claim that *Lawrence* removed any impediment to recognising that “Sexual Orientation” classifications warrant “Heightened Scrutiny,” and sometimes claim that the *Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services*, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) holding was in reliance on out-of-circuit cases that based their holdings on *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and thus incompatible with intervening contrary decisions of the Supreme Court and should not be followed.

Very good point! However, we must ask two questions: First, did *Lawrence* really demand use of heightened scrutiny, or, instead, was it merely a rejection of the ban on certain behaviour (sodomy, in this case)? Secondly, even if some justices in *Lawrence* personally relied on this, as Obiter Dictum, and not as a formal holding, is heightened scrutiny actually necessary as an absolute truth? ANSWER: *Bowers* held, first, that criminal prohibitions of homosexual sodomy are not subject to heightened scrutiny because they do not implicate a "fundamental right" under the Due Process Clause, 478 U.S., at 191-194. Noting that "[p]roscriptions

against that conduct have ancient roots," *id.*, at 192, that "[s]odomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights," *ibid.*, and that many States had retained their bans on sodomy, *id.*, at 193, *Bowers* concluded that a right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," *id.*, at 192. The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Lawrence* did not overrule this holding: Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a "fundamental right" or a "fundamental liberty interest," nor does it subject the Texas statute to "strict" scrutiny much less to "heightened" scrutiny! Nonetheless, some scrutiny is necessary due to the lingering prejudice that exists in both law and society against homosexuals. Thus, *Lofton* is still good case-law: a state's limitation of marriage to male-female unions must be subject only to deferential rational-basis review.

Nonetheless, I will conclude with one final statement on the "scrutiny wars," which are waged by lawyers on both sides of this argument: Lawyers for both sides have repeatedly bragged that their arguments are "sound," no matter WHICH level of scrutiny be applied, and thus dared The Courts to apply ANY level of scrutiny to test their arguments.

This amicus agrees with their claim on this head: While the 'Doctrine of Scrutiny' is certainly a useful guide, in the end, it matters not how much light This Court shines on all our arguments, and so "heightened scrutiny" is acceptable, and, in light of the national debate on 'Gay Marriage,' perhaps "even more scrutiny" should be given to both this case and the cases in the other U.S. Circuits, for example,

the *Brenner & Grimsley* cases, where the 11th Circuit is still 'reviewing' these Florida Gay Marriage cases. (*Brenner* and *Grimsley* should be reviewed *en banc*, I think, decided upon, one way or the other, and then granted Certiorari for This Court's review, and consolidated with these instant grants in the case at bar.)

In *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), at 648 Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissent, said: “[U]nless, of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals.” This would seem to contradict my claims that the instant brief (by Amicus, Gordon W. Watts) was the first to use “Polygamy vs. Gay Marriage” as a formal “Equal Protection” argument; however, reading Justice Scalia's comments in the context of this holding, we see that *Romer* merely addresses denial of certain rights to gays: it did not address the legal definition of marriage, a similar, but legally distinct, question of law. Thus, Scalia's comments, while legally-correct, were merely obiter dictum: comments on the definition of marriage, and not on treatment issues.

Romer set the stage for *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which dealt with another treatment issue: private sexual conduct (sodomy, in this case) – again, not the legal definition of marriage (which is under review in the case at bar).

In *Lofton v. Sec. of the Dept. of Children and Family Services*, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), *inter alia*, the 11th Circuit declined to treat homosexuals as a suspect class, and then, subsequently declined the Plaintiffs petition for rehearing *en banc*.

The key point of *U.S. v. Windsor*, 133 S.Ct.

2675 (2013), was not that it struck down DOMA (the The Defense of Marriage Act), nor the obiter dictum that “differentiation [in marital status] demeans the couple” in question. The only key point in the *Windsor* holding that applies to the case at bar is that The U.S. Supreme Court upheld “States' Rights” for NY to define marriage as it sees fit; if anything, this supports citizens' initiatives & legislative acts to define marriage as the elected majority see fit, as has happened in four 6th Cir. states and Florida (where an almost 62% supermajority voted for its passage).

V. Correcting common errors of 'Traditional Marriage' advocates

In my amicus before the consolidated 11th Cir. Cases, *Brenner* and *Grimsley*, I supported the appellant's bid to defend Florida's Laws (and addition to the State Constitution by citizen initiative) defining marriage as 1-man & 1-woman, but I was honest enough to “take them to task” for a few slips of legal logic, and as many other advocates make similar arguments, it will be instructive to This Court to be ready when you see them:

On page 7 of the “JOINT INITIAL BRIEF OF ALL APPELLANTS” (*Brenner v. Armstrong*, 14-14061, and *Grimsley v. Armstrong*, 11th Cir. 2014, perfected, brief of appellants at page 7), the State of Florida states that: “In fact, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding same-sex marriage, *United States v. Windsor*, is fully consistent with the principle that federalism allows States to define marriage.”

This is not totally correct: Federalism (aka,

10th Amendment “States' Rights”) only goes so far: What if, for example, Florida wanted to legalise Polygamy? Would the Federal Government (Supremacy Clause) allow us to? God forbid, and certainly not! Above that, and also on page 7, defendants state: “Florida has long defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman.” They implicate the **Doctrine of *Stare Decisis***, which is essentially the doctrine of precedent: Latin for “to stand by things decided.” While this is a good metric to consider, it is not absolute: Think, for example, of when African Americans were told by the U.S. Supreme Court that they lacked the rights of a human: America's Highest Court held, by a overwhelming margin of a 7-2 split decision, that: “...that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.” -Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, writing for the Court. (*Dred Scott v. John F. Sanford*, 15 L.Ed. 691; 19 How. 393; 60 US 393 at 407. (December Term, 1856)).

Should America have “continued precedent,” here? Of course not. Defendants were more accurate when they said on page 11, that: “States Have Nearly Exclusive Authority to Define and Regulate Marriage,” and the keyword, there, is “nearly.”

So, how long Florida has defined marriage –or how we have States' Rights –are both important, and relevant, issues to consider, but are not, by a long-shot, nearly as decisive as, for example, the Equal Protection argument advanced by this Amicus brief: Since we rightly reject Polygamy –and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future –then we must, perforce, reject Gay Marriage –and all its

ramifications. (But we must not do so with animus or hate –any more than we have shown towards polygamy advocates.) Indeed, This Court has held that “Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe.” (*Reynolds v. U.S.*, 98 U.S. at 164 (1878)). Yes, this is 'old' case law, but don't laugh: it hasn't been overturned: Thus, it's still good case law which held that the federal anti-bigamy statute didn't violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause, even in spite of the fact that plural marriage was part of religious practice of certain religions. So, Florida was, indeed, correct to assert that *Baker v. Nelson*, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972), remains binding precedent –just not for their reasons stated (precedent or states' rights), but, rather, for the reasons this brief puts forth: namely, that same-sex marriage doesn't violate Due Process or Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment since even polygamists can't mount a Constitutional challenge to a ban on polygamy; how much less can Gay Marriage advocates ever hope to succeed –in a fair court –that honours & respects Equal Protection viz. Polygamy vs. Gay Marriage?

VI. PROPOSED ORDER

Above, I made compelling arguments about the problem and suggest a “general” solution, but I fail to specifically ask the court for a detailed order that could carry out this general request, and, in order to be a good “friend” of the court, and show you things that others may have missed, it is my duty to be specific and detailed in my request for relief, so I

shall now “finish the job” here. There are two (2) different ways that This Court might address the conflict before it:

The first would be to uphold the 'traditional' definition of marriage, which the 6th Circuit panel rightly found (thus satisfying the respondents), but also correct some deficiencies in law (thus satisfying the appellants). This could require This Court to “affirm in part; reverse in part; and remand for orders consistent with This Court's holding.” This solution is tempting, since it fixes the problem “all at once.” The only problem with this solution is that there are so many laws that depend on the definition of marriage, it might, as a practical matter, be impossible.

The second (and more practical) solution would simply be to uphold the 'traditional' definition of marriage as “1 man and 1 woman,” but direct Appellants and their supporters to challenge 'bad' laws individually. Lest this august and solemn Court think I am making an unreasonable suggestion, let me illustrate but a few examples: In *Lawrence*, for example, a Texas law that was deemed 'bad' was struck down (by the Judicial branch) without perverting or altering the definition of “marriage” as '1 man and 1 woman.' Another example was when a State Appeals Court found that a Florida statute prohibiting adoption by homosexuals had “no rational basis” and thus violated their equal protection rights. (*Fla. Dept. of Children and Families v. In re: Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G.*, Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D08-3044, Opinion filed September 22, 2010) Again, FLORIDA'S 2008 definition of marriage was not perverted, struck,

abrogated, or altered.

Likewise, it need not be perverted or struck here, as well: to do so would simply be trying to say a square is round, or that $1+1=3$, when, by the definition, it does not –or that “a man” = “a woman,” when this, also, is not true. Indeed, “The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both[.]” *Ballard v. United States*, 329 U.S. 187, 193, 67 S. Ct. 261, 264 (1946) (Douglas, J.). And, re that difference: “The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” *Tigner v. Texas*, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S. Ct. 879, 882 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).

VII. Inferior Federal Courts didn't even have jurisdiction to address 'Gay Marriage' dispute

On it's face, it would seem that the Supremacy Clause would allow a Federal District Court to 'strike down' any state law or state Constitutional provision, such as has been happening in the 'Gay Marriage' dispute, nationwide. *But, is this so?*

Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d. 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003), held that: "The only federal court whose decisions bind state courts is the United States Supreme Court." Their advisory opinion on this head evokes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which, in essence, holds that lower United States federal courts may not sit in direct review of state court decisions. This would give a strong support to Federalism, and 10th Amendment State's rights,

that is, that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States." Accord: *Arizonans for official English and Robert D. Park, Petitioners v. ARIZONA et al.*, 520 U.S. 43, at Syllabus 23, note 11, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held: "(Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law)." In other words, lower Federal Courts may not sit in appellate review of state court decisions; they may only address these issues through original jurisdiction (which, apparently, the plaintiffs allege, insofar as they claim that the' state laws in question are unconstitutional).

While this case law seems counter-intuitive, let me illustrate why this, if taken to its logical end, is not reasonable: What if, for example, residents from 49 U.S. states appeared in one single Federal District Court (of the 50th state), demanding that their states' laws, recognising marriage one way or the other, should yield to the State Law of the 50th State, where the case is being heard, and demand The Court enter a ruling that the laws of these 49 states are unconstitutionally-restrictive, and ask The Court to exercise "Long Arm Jurisdiction" to enforce such an order against these 49 states? Well, what if, then, *another* U.S. District Court entered a ruling just the opposite? Can you not see the mayhem and confusion that would surely ensue? (And, as it stands, the nation-wide 'patchwork' of Gay Marriage Laws has effectively made my prophecy, here, come true!) So, the case law that holds that the Supremacy Clause is restricted in this regard is 'good' case law: **Only the *your* Court may exercise jurisdiction in this**

regard, and most other courts, while well-meaning and well-intentioned, have exceeded their authority.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This Court might be tempted to hold that “marriage” must include “Gay Marriage,” in order to satisfy the just and legitimate complaints of mistreatment against homosexuals. While tempting, this approach is “throwing out the baby with the bathwater”: for example, just because a few judges (or a few cops) are 'bad,' do we remove all judges (or cops) –and destroy The Judicial (or Executive) Branch? God forbid, and certainly not! Likewise, just because a 'few' laws discriminate against homosexuals, must we pervert and alter the very 'definition' of marriage? (Certainly not: this would require us to allow Polygamists to be considered 'married,' in order to satisfy Equal Protection, as discussed in the instant brief, and we all know that is untenable.)

While there is certainly mistreatment based solely on “marital status,” it isn't a result of these state laws, but rather, independent and long-standing –and should be corrected as separate issues, but both polygamy and gay marriage should remain illegal; and, indeed, if polygamy is illegal on a Federal Level (and it is), then how much more should Gay Marriage be illegal in all 50 states, according to Federal Law? Therefore, the various Laws (and Constitutional Provisions) limiting “marriage” to be defined as “1 man and 1 woman” should be upheld on appeal: Gay Marriage proponents have even less legal ground on which to stand than do Polygamist

Advocates, and thus their case has little chance of succeeding. The 6th Circuit panel's definition of marriage (which supports the laws and/or initiatives passed in no less than FOUR STATES, representing MANY citizens/voters, and thus representing the 'voice of the people') is Constitutional: Gay citizens are not overly impaired in their basic human rights: rights to travel, rights to peaceable assembly and associate with whomever they chose, Intimate Association –nor do these Laws violate the Establishment Clause: Just because a law “agrees with” religion –for example: Thou Shalt Not Kill, yet it is not necessarily a violation, here. Prejudice exists in law against both straights and gays, and it is wrong, but not due to these reasonable laws: This Court should uphold the Lower Tribunal's ruling on the definition of marriage and possibly correct a few errors in the current laws (as a example), –or (better yet) enter a ruling that directs Appellants and their supporters that unconstitutional laws may be challenged individually. The circuits are split, and the public (strongly “pro-marriage”) is also split on this issue: The nation all looks to This Honourable Court to “get it right” for all sides, so let's do just that. **Therefore, the certified questions should be answered as follows:**

1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? ANSWER: No. (“[U]nless, of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals.” *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), at 648; well, *do they?*)

2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? ANSWER: This question is moot in light of the fact that marriage between any combination (2 men; 2 women; plural marriages with, say 1 man and 3 women; or “3 men and a baby!”) other than “1 man & 1 woman” is hereby deemed not “lawfully licensed” by the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection standards, which recognise that polygamy's prohibition requires the prohibition of all other unions of Equal or Lesser legality.

Respectfully submitted,

/x/

Gordon Wayne Watts, *Amicus Curiae*: Friend of the Court /

Amicus Curium (friend of several courts: *plural*)

<http://GordonWatts.com> /

<http://GordonWayneWatts.com>

821 Alicia Road, Lakeland, Florida 33801-2113

H: (863) 688-9880 ; W: 863-686-3411 ; 863-687-6141

E-mail: gww1210@aol.com ; gww1210@gmail.com

Gordon W. Watts, PRO SE / PRO PER, *in persona propria*

[[Note: put lawyer's name here, instead of mine.]]

BS, The Florida State University, Biological & Chemical Sciences;

Class of 2000, double major with honours

AS, United Electronics Institute, Class of 1988,

Valedictorian

* Watts, acting counsel of record, is not a lawyer. **Per RULE 34.1(f), Watts, appearing *pro se*, is listed.**

Dated: Day-of-week, DD Month 2015 ***[[Update this]]***

APPENDICES: Table of Contents

Apx. A: Debt Statement showing I can't afford lawyer

Apx. B-C: Selected receipts showing 11th Cir. costs

Apx. D: Food Stamp certification, verifying poverty

Apx. E: Selected Order of the Court granting motion

Apx. F-H: Documentation of my near-win re *Schiavo*

Apx. A: Credit Card balance, showing my huge debt:

e Gordon Watts

Your last successful login was
01/20/2015 3:21 AM

Account ending in 2738
863-688-9880
gww1210@aol.com
[Update](#)

Current Balance*:	\$1,495.37
Minimum Payment Due:	\$33.00
Payment Due Date:	02/10/2015
Available Credit*:	\$6,404.00
Available For Cash Advance*:	\$1,580.00
Total Credit Limit:	\$7,900.00

Apx. B: Selected U.S. Postal Mail costs I incurred as amicus in the U.S. 11th Circuit cases, Brenner, 14-14061, and Grimsley, 14-14066:

MAITLAND FL 32150 First-Class Mail Large Env 4.40 oz. Expected Delivery: Sat 11/22/14	Issue Postage: TALLAHASSEE FL 32301 Zone-3 First-Class Mail Large Env 4.40 oz. Expected Delivery: Sat 11/22/14	===== \$1.82 \$1.82
JACKSONVILLE FL 32207 Zone-3 First-Class Mail Large Env 4.40 oz. Expected Delivery: Sat 11/22/14	Issue Postage: Total: \$18.20	===== \$1.82 \$18.20

Paid by: MasterCard
Account #: 020680
Approval #: 383
Transaction #: 23 903571057

* 2738 \$18.20
XXXXXXXXXXXX2738

18.20

stamps at usps.com/shop or call 1-800-ASK-USPS. For more information, go to usps.com/clicknship or call 1-800-ASK-USPS. For more information, call 1-800-ASK-USPS.

***** want i

Apx. C: Ibid.

Location:
Device ID:
Transaction:

Sender Address:
Gordon Watts
821 Alicia Rd
Lakeland, FL 33801
8636889880

Recipient Address:
US Court of Appeals 11th Cir
US Court of Appeals 11th Cir
56 Forsyth St, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
4043356100

Apx. D: My Florida State food stamp certification, showing quantitative proof that I really am too poor to hire a lawyer to represent me before the U.S. Supreme Court, and must proceed pro se:

Case Information

This information is current as of January 21, 2015 .If you made any change information to be processed into the system. Please check back later.

Case Number	Head of the Household	Scheduled Appointment
1165166518	GORDON W. WATTS	No appointment scheduled

My Benefits

Benefits
Food Assistance

Apx. E: Ruling showing my motion for amended brief was GRANTED while another motion was DENIED:

Case: 14-14061 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 2 of 2

ORDER:

Clare Anthony Citro's motions for leave to file out of time and for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* are DENIED.

Gordon Wayne Watts's motion for leave to file an amended *amicus curiae* brief is GRANTED.


UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Apx. F:

Citations to my near-win, in which I almost won in court – all by myself – on behalf of Terri Schiavo, as next friend, losing 4-3, and doing better, even, than a sitting State Governor and Terri's blood family – combined:

- *In Re: Gordon Wayne Watts (as next friend of Theresa Marie 'Terri' Schiavo)*, No. SC03-2420 (Fla. Feb.23, 2003), denied 4-3 on rehearing. (Watts got 42.7% of his panel)
<http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/dispositions/2005/2/03-2420reh.pdf>
- *In Re: Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida, et al. v. Michael Schiavo, Guardian: Theresa Schiavo*, No. SC04-925 (Fla. Oct.21, 2004), denied 7-0 on rehearing. (Bush got 0.0% of his panel before the same court)
<http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/dispositions/2004/10/04-925reh.pdf>
- *Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo*, 403 F.3d 1223, 2005 WL 648897 (11th Cir. Mar.23, 2005), denied 2-1 on appeal. (Terri Schiavo's own blood family only got 33.3% of their panel on the Federal Appeals level)
<http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/200511556.pdf>

Apx. G:

Selected filings and research from Watts' official website – to see actual examples of briefs, etc.:

* <http://GordonWatts.com/TerriSupremeCourt.pdf>

*<http://GordonWatts.com/Student-Loan-Abuse Brief.pdf>

*<http://GordonWayneWatts.com/TerriSupremeCourt.pdf>

*<http://GordonWayneWatts.com/Student-Loan-Abuse Brief.pdf>

Apx. H:

Selected amicus filings by Watts, posted at the Fla. Sup. Ct. archives:

http://www.FloridaSupremeCourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/04/04-925/index.html